

Aviation Human Factors Industry News

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From the sands of Kitty Hawk, the tradition lives on.

Hello all,

To subscribe send an email to: rhughes@humanfactorsedu.com

In this weeks edition of *Aviation Human Factors Industry News* you will read the following stories:

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Introducing TACG's Human Factors Reachout Program for Underserved Countries

On a global basis, there are a large number of aviation operators that need a Human Factors (HF) training program. Unfortunately, some of these operators are the least able to afford the resources required for HF implementation. A lack of financial and/or human resources can make it very challenging, if not impossible to properly implement an HF program and provide employee training on a regular basis.

The Aviation Consulting Group is proud to now offer **free HF Train-The-Trainer course** to operators in these underserved countries. Unlike other training providers, which may, at best, offer small discounts on their courses, TACG believes that free is a much better option! Our HF Train-The-Trainer (**5-day long course**) is completely free of charge.



For additional information, including prerequisites please visit our Reachout webpage at <http://www.tacgworldwide.com/reachout.htm>

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Cargo Pilots Say Fatigue Leading To Big Danger Below

Dozens of huge cargo jets fly over Bay Area neighborhoods daily, and the pilots flying them say **lack of rest** is creating a big danger below.

On August 14, 2013, at 4:47 a.m., a UPS cargo plane flying from Louisville, Ky. to Birmingham, Ala. crashed and burst into flames short of the runway. The two pilots on board didn't survive.

Cockpit discussions recovered from the black box in the crash revealed a conversation between the two [that was centered on sleep](#).



"When my alarm went off, I mean, I'm thinking... I'm so tired," said the first officer.

"I know," replied the captain.

Federal regulations don't require cargo pilots to get as much rest as passenger pilots.

["Fatigue is an integral part of the job,"](#) UPS Pilot Bob Matchette told KPIX 5. "It's managing that fatigue, that is where the challenge lies."

Like the grueling route that goes from Anchorage, Alaska to Oakland, then to Ontario, then back to Oakland, then to Ontario again, and finally back to Anchorage. It's been dubbed the ["Oakland death march"](#) by Matchette and his fellow pilots.

"You're always concerned about not just yourself, but obviously the people that are underneath your approach and landing path," said Matchette.

Matchette said the Alabama crash [is proof](#) that federal regulations need to change.

Yet, a time-lapsed video from the Independent Pilots Association shows that cargo pilots fly mostly at night.

"They face special challenges that someone flying during the day doesn't have," said Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, famous for piloting the US Airways jet that made a miraculous landing in New York's Hudson River. He said [it's a risk to the public and the pilots](#).

“The cargo industry managed to get them carved out and excluded from having to comply with better rest, so that’s something that definitely has to be changed,” he said.

The FAA failed to include cargo pilots when it tightened rest rules for passenger pilots last year. Passenger pilots are [limited to nine hours of duty during the night](#). [Cargo pilots can be scheduled for 16 hours](#).

“With all due respect, Captain Sullenberger is wrong. The fact is this is not a lobbying effort, this was a legal proceeding conducted at the FAA,” said Steve Alterman with the Cargo Industry Association. He says the pilots don’t need the extra rest.

“Our pilots already fly only about half the time than the passenger pilots do, so it’s a completely different model,” he said.

But, Matchette disagrees. “We fly the same equipment, landing on the same runways, in and out of the same airports as all passenger jets flying over the same neighborhoods,” he said. “I think it’s absolutely safe to say that it could be a lot safer.”

<http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/video?autoStart=true&topVideoCatNo=default&clipId=10857142>

Man Pleads Guilty To Fraud Over Helicopter Weights

A former executive of a southern Oregon company whose helicopter crashed, killing nine people fighting a 2008 wildfire, has pleaded guilty to providing false aircraft weights to the U.S. Forest Service to win a firefighting contract.

Steven Metheny, of Medford, pleaded guilty Monday in federal court in Medford to fraud and conspiracy, two of the 22 counts of the indictment against him. Metheny was vice president of Carson Helicopters outside Grants Pass when one of the company's helicopters crashed on takeoff while carrying a firefighting crew fighting the Iron 44 fire on the Shasta-Trinity National Forest near Weaverville, California. [It was the deadliest helicopter crash involving working firefighters in U.S. history](#).

Sentencing was set for March 2. Metheny faces up to 25 years in prison and \$250,000 in fines on the two charges.

Defense lawyer Steve Myers noted that prosecutors never alleged that the false helicopter weights in any way contributed to the crash, and the plea agreement contained no reference to responsibility for the crash.



Nina Charlson, of Eugene, whose 25-year-old son was killed in the crash, told The Mail Tribune that she had expected Metheny to admit responsibility for the crash.

U.S. Attorney Amanda Marshal said in a statement that the false information created a ["reckless risk of harm to those who used the information in firefighting operations,"](#) including those involved with the helicopter that crashed.

The National Transportation Safety Board investigation showed the helicopter weighed more than [19,000 pounds](#) when pilots tried to take off, while Forest Service guidelines called for a limit of [15,840 pounds](#).

A Portland jury found that an engine problem was responsible for the crash.

In the plea agreement, Metheny admitted that he conspired with Levi Phillips, former director of maintenance for Carson, to submit false weights for their empty Sikorsky S-61N helicopters in their bid to the Forest Service for firefighting contracts in 2008. Phillips [had created a formula to estimate the weight of empty helicopters](#), rather than actually weighing them, and Metheny knew the weights in the bids were based on estimates. The estimates were used to meet minimum contract specifications.

Phillips pleaded guilty to fraud in 2013 and had agreed to testify against Metheny. His sentencing was scheduled for Feb. 2, but Myers said he expected the two men to be sentenced together.

The Safety Space and Practical Drift

Bob Baron, Ph.D
President,
The Aviation Consulting Group

In everyday operations, aviation organizations operate in what is known as the “safety space.” The safety space is a continuum between Baseline Performance (i.e., angel performance) and an Accident (see figure below). Fortunately, the safety space is quite wide and with a [large margin of error tolerance](#).



The Safety Space and Practical Drift. ©2014

Within this safety space, [practical drift inevitably occurs](#). Practical drift is dynamic and can shift significantly within a short period of time. When there's right drift, safety is deteriorating, which may lead to an accident. When there's left drift, safety is improving, possibly to baseline performance. Baseline performance means that an organization is doing everything by the book. All policies, rules, regulations, procedures, etc. are being followed to the letter. Thus, theoretically, the chance of having an accident or incident is extremely low. In reality, an organization rarely achieves, and/or maintains, baseline performance.

The closest an organization may come to baseline performance is when operations first begin, during external audits, FAA inspections, or immediately following an accident or incident. [In a perfect world](#), all organizations would perform at baseline all the time. In practicality, this will not happen. Among the reasons for this is that people tend to deviate from, and/or fail to follow, policies, rules, regulations, and procedures. Most accidents occur not because of a lack of procedures, policies, checklists, etc., but rather because those procedures and policies are just not being used. And to make matters worse, deviations from written procedures tend to become [cultural norms](#) (routine violations).

If practical drift progresses too far to the right of the scale then the likelihood of an accident or incident increases. If an accident does occur, then typically the organization will make immediate rectifications in order to try to achieve baseline performance. In other words, the needle will go from the extreme right side of the scale to the extreme left side in a very short period of time. This was the case in the crash of Continental Express Flight 2574. Flight 2574 was an Embraer 120 that crashed in Texas in 1991, killing all onboard. The crash occurred because, during a shift turnover, the outgoing shift did not inform the incoming shift that [47 screws](#) needed to be put back on the horizontal stabilizer. Slack shift turnovers were the norm, and although there were procedures in place to safely conduct shift turnovers, they were just not being used. This is an example of practical drift where the needle goes too far to the right and an accident occurs. Unsurprisingly, the airline quickly attempted to go back to baseline performance immediately after the accident.

Unfortunately—even with accidents and significant safety events—organizations will, over time, drift back to the right of baseline performance. To think that an organization can possibly maintain baseline performance is unrealistic. In a perfect world, that's the way it would be, but in the practical world that just will not happen. The question is [where is YOUR organization](#) in the safety space right now? If the needle is too far to the right then you may want to start making a left correction!

Press Release - FAA Proposes \$150,000 Civil Penalty Against AAR Aircraft Services

The U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing a \$150,000 civil penalty against AAR Aircraft Services Inc. of Oklahoma City, Okla., for [alleged aircraft maintenance violations](#). The FAA alleges AAR used an [unqualified repairman](#) to perform at least 18 maintenance tasks on a major air carrier's aircraft between September 2012 and May 2013. The FAA discovered the alleged violations during an inspection.

The FAA alleges the repairman performed maintenance that [he was not authorized to perform](#) by his repairman certificate.

AAR has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA's enforcement letter to respond to the Agency.



Take the Fight to the Enemy: Combating Human Error is Still Our Top Challenge

By Dr. Tony Kern, Ed.D

Chief Executive Officer, Convergent Performance

A few years back, after the publication of [Blue Threat: Why to Err is Inhuman](#), I was interviewed on the topic of human error. With the rash of human error mishaps in the news recently, I thought it might be timely to revisit the number one enemy of aviation safety and how we can get past the old adage that "to err is human."

Q: Let's start with the basics. What is the Blue Threat?

Dr. Kern: The Blue Threat is the internal threat – the things we do to ourselves and each other that end up sabotaging our goals and missions. The term comes from the business and military threat assessment models where the red threat is what the competition and the situation can throw at you, and the blue threat is the damaging things we do to ourselves that derail safety, projects, programs, profit and potential. Q: Aren't making mistakes just a part of being human?



Dr. Kern: To some degree, maybe. But just saying “to err is human” is a cop out for avoidable and correctable mistakes and gives up far too much ground. For too long, we have accepted human error as an inescapable part of our lives or tried to “manage” it after it occurs. It has resulted in unnecessary compromise of our life's mission and goals. Recent research provides a body of knowledge that is capable of changing our performance, and our lives, for the better. This is life-altering knowledge. Applying it successfully demands a rigorous approach that results in known competencies and predictable performance. But it is well worth it.

Q: Don't you think that “declaring war” on human error in 2002 was a little over the top?

Dr. Kern: Not at all. Every year, on average, human error results in more unnecessary death and suffering than all of the wars in the world combined. But getting beyond safety statistics, industries suffer billions of dollars in lost revenue as a direct result of preventable human error, which results in job losses for thousands. And these numbers don't factor in the lost opportunities for progress and improvement. No, declaring a war on error was not over the top, it was long overdue.

Q: OK. How do you go about battling the Blue Threat?

Dr. Kern: The key to victory over the randomness and variability of human error is first to realize that error is only random in a group setting. When you get down to a sample size of one – you – error is both predicable and preventable. After that, it is just a matter of learning some new information and applying a set of tools.

Of course, first you need to accept the fact that you are making avoidable errors and desire to change. Every program we offer at Convergent stresses this key aspect.

Q: Isn't something this critical taught in technical training or somewhere else inside most occupations?

Dr. Kern: Oddly no, and I think I know a couple of reasons why. First, we have long assumed – incorrectly – that when we train someone to do something right, we are simultaneously training them not to do it wrong. This fundamental premise of our training programs is grossly in error and responsible for hundreds of thousands of lost lives and billions in lost revenue every year. The skill set for error prevention is unique and currently not taught anywhere except the few places where it was researched and developed over the past few years. The second reason I believe we don't yet teach personal error control is because the world has gone brain dead on the issues of personal responsibility and accountability. These aren't politically correct terms in some circles. Listen, no one wakes up in the morning wanting to screw up – or thinking that they are going to. If we can provide them with the knowledge and tools to recognize and prevent their personal mistakes, most people who care about their performance will do so of their own accord.

Q: How long does it take someone to get a handle on the Blue Threat?

Dr. Kern: Some results are almost immediate; others will be refined over the course of a lifetime. It is important to realize from the start that error control is far less about training than it is about understanding. Self-awareness is a personal mastery skill that encompasses many complex variables, ranging from an accurate assessment of one's skill and knowledge to the physiological readiness to perceive, interpret, evaluate, plan and act in a tightly-coupled, error-intolerant environment. These skills are within our grasp, but they are not intuitive. They must be learned. Error control is not common sense, as many would have us believe. It is uncommon sense, yet well within our reach if we just take readily available information and apply it. This is the reason the Blue Threat program was designed and developed. If I could leave you with one thing, it would be this: Personal error control is a discipline – a way of life. And once you've mastered it, you will be amazed at the results and wonder why you waited so long to do something this simple and powerful.

Blue Threat is available at www.pygmybooks.com



Crossing the line: Runway Incursions

Runway incursions, a top FAA safety concern, are formally defined as “any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and takeoff of aircraft.”¹ Runway incursions can be caused by Pilot Deviations, Air Traffic Controller Operational Incidents, and Ground Vehicle Deviations. Examples of these errors include:

Pilot Deviations

- Crossing a runway hold marking without ATC clearance
- Taking off without clearance
- Landing without clearance

Controller Operational Incidents

- Clearing an aircraft onto a runway while another aircraft is landing on the same runway
- Issuing a takeoff clearance while the runway is occupied by another aircraft or vehicle

Vehicle (Driver) Deviations

- Crossing a runway hold marking without ATC clearance

Regardless of whose actions caused it, the inappropriate or unauthorized presence of an aircraft or vehicle on an active runway can lead to serious consequences. The following ASRS reports offer insight into some of the human factors and other issues involved in runway incursions.

Primed and Ready for an Error

Expectation bias, fueled by familiar precursors to a “line up and wait” clearance, led this B737 flight crew to enter the runway prematurely.

■ We were holding short of Runway 06L and takeoffs and landings were being conducted on the runway. The Captain had mentioned that he **had a commute to catch at [our destination]** and we were issued a wheels up time. The aircraft ahead in the run-up area was cleared for takeoff. I glanced right, saw the next arrival for the runway and thought we might be able to get out before him if we got clearance right now. The Captain released the parking brake to inch forward to the Hold Short line since the aircraft ahead had departed. As we were rolling, the Tower Controller issued instructions to amend our departure. I read them back and then focused my attention on the automation to reset the departure.... As I looked back outside the aircraft, I saw that we were lining up on the runway. As my focus had been inside the airplane, I did not immediately perceive any error. I then tried to think back whether we had been cleared to line up. As we lined up, ATC instructed another aircraft to go-around. It then clicked **that we had never been cleared to line up and wait**. The Captain then also realized his error.

Some factors included how ATC worded the departure amendment in a way that **sounded like the precursor** to a line up and wait or takeoff clearance. Another was glancing at the next arrival. Since our wheels up time had come, my mindset was that we were next and had enough room if we got clearance to takeoff right away. When ATC issued the departure amendment, the aircraft was already rolling forward as my head went down. I felt aircraft movement because we had been creeping forward, but **did not realize** how far we had gone before putting my head back up.

Four Leadership Strategies to Enhance Your Safety Culture

When you're looking at your commitment to safety and your workers' perceptions of safety in the workplace, examine your leadership style and safety management system. Get into the habit of thinking about the process of recognizing hazards and finding ways to control them.

When you're thinking in terms of leadership, systems, and processes, **workers will start to see safety** as an integrated, long-term, value-enhancing, positive process rather than as a standalone program that is often at odds with production.

Here are some leadership strategies that can help:

Ask the right questions. Look at safety initiatives and accident investigations as action planning, not fault-finding missions. That way, rather than focusing on the past and on things that can't be changed, you'll be focused on ways to improve safety performance going forward.

Improve your communications skills. When instituting a new control, explain to affected workers why they are being asked to change what they normally do and what success will look like.

Identify and manage cost drivers. Workplace injuries and illnesses involve a substantial amount of "hidden" costs, such as lost workdays, workers' compensation, and replacing a worker. Identify these costs and measure them over time. If you can measure them, you can manage them. Make the case to management that these costs can be managed and reduced with a stronger commitment to safety.

Don't accept failure. Accepting that "accidents happen" is an indication of a faltering safety culture—one where employers and workers are not in control of their own fate. In companies with a strong safety culture, employers and employees work together to identify and control hazards before anyone is seriously hurt. That's the kind of environment that can properly be called a "positive safety culture."



Navy inquiry cites complacency in sub fire

Complacency about safety during shipyard repairs and dependency on firefighters who didn't specialize in fires aboard ships contributed to the severity of a blaze that crippled a \$900 million nuclear submarine, Navy investigators concluded.

Investigators also said confusion at the start of the May 2012 fire at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard squandered precious minutes as the fire grew aboard the USS Miami and that there were two hour-long periods in which no water was put on the flames. The conclusions, some of which were disputed by firefighters, were included in more than 100 pages of documents obtained by The Associated Press under a Freedom of Information Act request.



It took 12 hours and the efforts of more than 100 firefighters to save the Groton, Connecticut-based Miami after a worker who wanted to go home early set a small fire that quickly spread. Though the sub was saved, the Navy ultimately decided to scrap it after the repair bill hit \$700 million.

The fire severely damaged living quarters, the command and control center and a torpedo room, but it did not reach the nuclear propulsion components. Seven people were hurt dousing the flames.

"Complacency had set in, based on the infrequency of shipyard fires and relative success of fire prevention measures," the report said. "Also, there was an assumption that the proximity to far more assets, especially federal firefighters, reduced the likelihood of a fire not being quickly contained. This organizational reluctance to prepare for a fire of this scale should serve as a wake-up call — large fires can and do happen in industrial environments."

The Navy launched a series of investigations that led to recommendations, including the installation of temporary automatic fire detection systems while vessels are being repaired or overhauled. It issued a new fire safety and prevention manual.

The Navy says it has [learned lessons](#) from the Miami fire and shared them across the fleet.

"We will continue to apply best response practices into shipyard fire emergency plans," Navy spokesman Lt. Timothy Hawkins said Thursday.

A report by U.S. Fleet Forces Command indicated just how dire the situation became aboard the Los Angeles-class submarine, which was undergoing a 20-month overhaul in Kittery, Maine: At one point, officials discussed abandoning their firefighting efforts and flooding the dry dock when it appeared the submarine was going to be lost.

Instead, firefighters battling extreme heat, cramped compartments and near-zero visibility eventually beat back the flames.

Investigators said [shipyard firefighters were unfamiliar](#) with the submarine's layout and that there was no requirement for certification to battle a fire in a shipboard environment — or even conduct a walk-through to familiarize themselves with the sub.

But Brian Tapley, who was the shipyard fire chief at the time, disputed any suggestion that the firefighters were unfamiliar with Miami. Firefighters conducted monthly walk-throughs, practiced dragging hoses through submarines and never flunked a drill, he said.

Tapley also disputed a Navy assertion that firefighters didn't ask about the submarine's battery, even though fighting a battery fire with water can result in an explosion. The sub's commanding officer confirmed the batteries were removed, he said.

The report noted that holes cut in the submarine during repairs fed oxygen to the fire, turning the metal hull into a furnace.

"They climbed into the belly of an inferno," said Paul O'Connor, president of the Metal Trades Council, a union at the shipyard. ["Every one of them was a hero,"](#)

While the report questioned the readiness by firefighters, the Navy also said it was to blame for [failing to incorporate lessons learned from past fires](#) into training and for not making the roles for Navy authorities clear. At one point, an order was given to turn back the firefighters dispatched from the Groton submarine base, who knew how to fight this kind of a fire. That order was overruled.

The Fleet Forces report included 99 recommendations — virtually all of which were redacted because they weren't final decisions, Hawkins said.

The Navy experiences a fire of comparable magnitude to the Miami blaze about every five years, and without corrective action, that pattern would continue, investigators said.

U.S. Sen. Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he was disappointed the recommendations weren't made public, and said he plans to ask the Navy for them.

He wants to hold a congressional hearing on firefighting techniques and training to determine whether Congress should allocate additional funding.


"The report documents a very compelling need for **better training** and more expert firefighters that can help stop such catastrophic fires on submarines," he said.

The recommendations apply to ships that are being repaired or overhauled. The report notes that the vessels are more vulnerable in that setting because damage-control equipment is removed or inoperable; most of the crew is away; and temporary fire-control equipment is less familiar to crew.

Survey Shows That a Few Simple Words Can Make Employees Much Happier

What makes you happy at work? In most surveys about workers' priorities, compensation rates at the top. Getting a promotion is also important. Vacation time matters too, as does flexibility to attend to family needs like a sick child or parent. Now a new study from professional networking site LinkedIn shows that a significant number of employees care a lot about **being recognized for their contributions** with kind words from the boss.

They don't just want compliments on completion of big projects.



They want their everyday achievements to be noticed and recognized. An online survey of 450 adult full-time employees in late September and early October found that if the boss appreciates their everyday successes:

- 58% said they were more likely to have a better attitude at work
- 45% said they would be motivated to do a better job
- 32% said they would be motivated to stay with the company longer

Supervisors who don't make a show of appreciating their employees run the risk of losing workers. Younger workers care about this the most. Some more findings:

- 33% of workers across the board said they have resigned from a job because they didn't feel their everyday contributions were appreciated
- 37% of workers under 40 said they've quit because they were under-appreciated

The message to bosses: It's easy to take your employees for granted, especially when you're juggling deadlines and demands from above. But don't reserve the compliments for your team members for the culmination of a project or meeting a deadline. Instead appreciate their work every day.

New book highlights Alaska's bush pilots

Next in Arcadia Publishing's Images of Aviation series is "Alaska's Bush Pilots" from author Rob Stapleton with the Alaska Aviation Museum. The book showcases more than 200 vintage images of bush pilots and their role in Alaska's history.

Bush pilots are known as rough, tough, resourceful people who fly their aircraft into tight spots in the worst of weather. This new pictorial history shows how Alaska's bush pilots are all of that and more, according to the publisher. Images throughout the book show the history of aviation in Alaska and the progression of avionics. The first flight in Alaska was made over a three-day exhibition at Fairbanks in July of 1913, according to the book.



Readers will learn how James Martin first flew that aircraft, owned by him and his wife, Lilly, and investors Arthur Williams and R.S. McDonald.

The book examines the pioneer aviators and the aircraft types such as the Stearman, Stinson and Lockheed, many of which were tested and crashed in the far north regions of Alaska.

Alaska's Bush Pilots hopes to honor the aviators of "The Last Frontier," Stapleton says.

"It is a subject that appeals both to folks in Anchorage, who are proud of their local history, and perhaps even more so to the wider community of aviation enthusiasts," he adds.

The book is available at bookstores, independent retailers, and online retailers, such as [Amazon](#), or through [Arcadia Publishing](#).

The Gratitude Advantage: Four Ways Giving Thanks Improves Your Life

There are a lot of myths around the first American Thanksgiving in 1621, but one thing is for sure. The Pilgrims were lucky to be alive, and they knew it.

"Eleven months earlier the Pilgrims had arrived at the tip of Cape Cod, fearful and uninformed," says Nathaniel Philbrick in his history Mayflower.

"By all rights, none of the Pilgrims should have emerged from the first winter alive."



But they did. Thanks to God, their faith, and help from many Native Americans, they did more than survive. They began to flourish. And it's a virtuous circle.

Most of us know this from personal experience, but for the last several years researchers have come to the conclusion [that gratitude is a key component of helping people live happier and longer](#).

I know this is true in my life. It seems the more I give thanks, the more reasons I have for gratitude.

We all know that materialistic people who expect possessions to make them happy are usually unhappy—no matter how much stuff they get their hands on.

The reason, according to researchers at Baylor University is that by focusing on what we do not have, we are less likely to give thanks for what we do. And gratitude leads directly to feelings of satisfaction and wellbeing.

How? According to research reported by Robert A. Emmons and Anjali Mishra, , there are several scientifically supported ways gratitude helps us flourish. Here are four they found especially compelling:

1. [Gratitude reduces our stress](#). Thankfulness redirects our attention from our difficulties to the benefits we enjoy. It's like creating a stockpile of good thoughts for when times are tough. It also helps us reframe our losses and stay connected emotionally to friends and family.
2. [Gratitude inoculates us from negative emotions](#). When we focus on what we don't have or how our decisions could have turned out better, we leave room for resentment, envy, and regret to build. Gratitude can keep these feelings at bay.
3. [Gratitude sustains our relationships](#). Let me just ask, Do you like hanging out with people that gripe and complain? Me neither. It's gratitude that draws people together, builds trust, and strengthens ties. That's true in the workplace, among friends, in families, and between husbands and wives.
4. [Gratitude improves our health](#). Grateful people visit their doctors less often and live longer than others. The research shows that thankfulness helps us sleep better, control our blood pressure, and generally reduce physical complaints.

Given these four ways gratitude can benefit us, I'd say we have some very good reasons to return thanks more than once a year. [Cultivating gratitude](#) makes each day worth living and might even give us more days.

<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195373588/mhyatt-20>

The Psychology of Self-Motivation



Scott Geller is Alumni Distinguished Professor at Virginia Tech and Director of the Center for Applied Behavior Systems in the Department of Psychology. He is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association, the Association for Psychological Science, and the World Academy of Productivity and Quality. He has written numerous articles and books, including *When No One's Watching: Living and Leading Self-motivation*.

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sxpKhIbr0E>